

edited by

Ana Deumert

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COLONIAL &
DECOLONIAL
LINGUISTICS

Knowledges & Epistemes

OXFORD
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Colonial and Decolonial Linguistics

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ANA DEUMERT, ANNE STORCH,

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NICK SHEPHERD

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Using lusitanization and creolization as frameworks to analyse historical and contemporary Cape Verde language policy and planning

Cristine G. Severo and Sinfree B. Makoni

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses both the historical and contemporary status and spread of Portuguese in Cape Verde, using lusitanization and creolization as analytical frameworks. Lusitanization is a complex colonial and post-colonial political dispositif that led to the spread of Portuguese discourses and institutions in former Portuguese colonies, connecting Portugal, Brazil, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde, politically and geographically, as a consequence of Portuguese colonization, which began in the fifteenth century and ended in the second half of the twentieth century (Lourenço 1999; Severo and Makoni 2014, 2015). Creolization is a linguistic and political dispositif that invented Creole languages. We construe the notion of *dispositif* following Foucault (1980: 194) as a ‘heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’. Lusitanization is a political dispositif which renders it conceptually feasible to weave together slavery, religion, bureaucracy, and race into a single dynamic which includes Portuguese as a critically important element. Lusitanization consequently leads to the invention of Portugal as an idea.¹

In this chapter creolization is construed as a political index of colonization, that is, as a product of colonial encounters between the Portuguese and the Cape

¹ Based on Said’s (1978: 9) idea that ‘The Orient was almost a European invention In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West)’, we assume in this chapter that both Portugal and its colonies have been a product of colonial discourses and practices: colonization affected, in different ways, both the colonizer and the colonized.

Verdians. Cape Verde was selected because, as a former Portuguese colony, it played a central role in the Atlantic slave trade, connecting Africa with America, and in particular connecting Angola with Brazil. Sociolinguistically, lusitanization manifests itself through the production of a unique variety of language that can be traced back to Christianization, a process during which Indigenous languages were invented, and old words were given new meanings by colonial administrators and missionaries. The interplay between sociolinguistics and history had the effect of racializing Portuguese as a language, such that it was assumed that mother-tongue Portuguese speakers were white, and were nationals (citizens) of Portugal.

Lusitanization varied in its impact on the geographical and political formations of Portugal's colonies. As lusitanization is neither homogeneous nor uniform, its interpretation and implementation varied, depending on its key advocates. This included missionaries, government officials, and a Creole elite. It is a complex ideology embodied in the Christian practices of baptism and evangelization, the production of grammars and dictionaries, the slave trade, miscegenation, and modern institutions such as schooling and the invention of the modern state.

In this chapter, we analyse lusitanization from two dimensions, namely what Portuguese Creoles look like when viewed through the prism of lusitanization as opposed to a decreolization political perspective. The term and concept of Creoles originated in a specific sociohistorical context (Chaudenson 2001; Mufwene 2005), and was integrated into a colonial and racial dispositif that was used to label and classify the other (i.e., people and languages that did not fit the colonizer's frame of reference; DeGraff 2003; Mata 2014). One example of this racial production of Creole is the ideological connection between Creole and the Creole-speaking Cape Verdians as a way of classifying, labelling, and controlling people. The political process of inventing categories for the purpose of governing others will be discussed from two interrelated directions: from above, considering the conditions in which they are produced and the ways in which such categories circulate and socially propagate; and from below, considering the different ways in which such categories are appropriated and subverted (Foucault 1980; Brubaker 2002).

In this chapter, we criticize both the racial baggage and the linguistic interpretation of the concepts of Creole and creolization (Corrado 2008). We follow the 'politics of categories' (Brubaker 2002), and argue that both are part of the colonial legacy of linguistics. This leads us to a different interpretation: an interpretation that involves enquiring about the extent to which individuals are both the subject and the object of the analysis, and how those who were described become the ones who describe, forcing the colonizers to see themselves through the eyes of other people. We argue that the decreolization of lusitanization is a political and theoretical exercise. Portugal was created to a large extent by lusitanization (i.e., you need lusitanization to talk about Portugal as an idea, and you need Portugal to talk about Mozambique, Angola, and Cape Verde's resistance). Decreolizing lusitanization is about deconstructing the idea of Portugal as an empire and African countries as colonies. Creole is a racial category that was presented as natural to designate both the people and their language:

This term is reserved either for Mulattos or for individuals of the Malagasy or African type, which is relatively well marked... creoles are those who by their own phenotype cannot claim the term *white*. (Chaudenson 2001: 5–6)

We focus on Cape Verde for three reasons: (i) it was the earliest European and Portuguese colony (Green 2009); (ii) it formed the centre of the slave trade in the Atlantic Ocean between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and (iii) it connected Brazil and Angola geopolitically, economically, and culturally through the slave trade and thus provides insight into two other former colonies, Brazil and Angola.

In the light of the above, the chapter is divided into two parts: Section 4.2 discusses the historical relationship between Portugal, Cape Verde, and other former colonies through lusitanization; Section 4.3 looks at creolization as a prism through which lusitanization may be framed while, conversely, lusitanization is used as a framework for viewing creolization. In this section we also consider the political use of miscegenation by Portugal to discursively justify a so-called ‘soft’ colonization in Africa and Brazil (Freyre 1933).

We argue that the concepts of lusitanization, creolization, and miscegenation cannot be taken as previous theoretical constructions since they are products of historical power relations. This chapter contributes to the field of colonial linguistics by describing how discourses on language—the so-called Creoles—were part of a colonial dispositif that produced, in an entangled way, Portugal, Cape Verde, Brazil, and other Portuguese (‘Lusophone’) colonies. In this colonial process, miscegenation emerged as a powerful argument to justify an apparent non-violent process of mixture—of races and of languages—which we problematize. This chapter avoids replicating previous concepts to understand the colonial dynamics, especially because in Portuguese and Brazilian literature the ideas of miscegenation and lusitanization have been historically revised (Severo and Makoni 2015). Rather, we make an intellectual effort to subvert previous concepts, such as creolization, by submitting it to a political interpretation.

4.2 Cape Verde and lusitanization: a historical overview

Cape Verde is an archipelago made up of around ten islands, the biggest being Santiago and the smallest Brava, located about 500 km off the coast of Senegal (Figure 4.1). Cape Verde’s geographical position was historically a site of political tension between Spain and Portugal (Lobban 1995).

The Portuguese arrived in the archipelago in 1460. For the last 500 years, Cape Verde has been dominated by a heterogeneous group of people—including both colonizers and colonized—who have all had an impact on the society and culture of Cape Verde. It was a heterogeneous group of outcasts who were sent to the archipelago by Portugal and its Catholic Church (Samuels and Bailey 1969).




Figure 4.1 Map of Cape Verde

Between 1802 and 1882, Portugal had sent around 2,400 criminals—known as *degradados* or *lançados*—to Cape Verde, of whom only eighty-one were women, a fact that reveals the strong relation between colonialism and male domination (McClintock 1995; Seibert 2014). Such *degradados* were judicially punished with deportation. Cape Verde was considered a penal colony: both *degradados* (who were Portuguese criminals) and those from other colonies who fought for Independence (in the twentieth century) were sent to Cape Verde, for different reasons in different historical periods. Many Jews also left Portugal for Cape Verde during the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries after their forced conversion to Christianity (albeit with covert continuation of Jewish practice). The variety of Portuguese used in Cape Verde was ideologically perceived as the language of criminals because of the role of criminals as interpreters, translating Portuguese into local languages and conversely (Lobban 1995).

The Catholic Church in Cape Verde can be traced back to 1533, when Cape Verde emerged as a centre of Christianity in the region. Christians in Cape Verde fell into four groups: (i) old Christians, (ii) New Christians, (iii) priests from Portugal, and (iv) mixed-race Creoles. The first three were Europeans and the fourth group was composed largely of people defined as Africans.

New Christians were predominantly Jews who had been forcibly converted to Catholicism in accordance with the Catholic colonial doctrine of *Limpeza de Sangue* ('purification of blood'; Green 2009). This implied a process of segregation of New Christians, as per the Toledo Statute in 1449, a legal document that established a difference between Jewish blood and Jewish beliefs, and was used as an instrument of segregation to control the Jewish people.² When African slaves arrived in Cape Verde from other African regions, their names were invariably, without their consent, changed to Christian ones. Their conversion was also political insofar as it was designed to erase their sense of their own history. Thus, Catholicism played a key role in Cape Verde's lusitanization, since 'religion was the hegemonic arm of Portuguese power in the islands, a religion then appropriated by Creoles in their own struggles to form an autonomous ideology' (Green 2009: 119). Christianity was used as a strategy to spread Portuguese. The spread of Christianity was therefore inextricably linked to Portuguese colonialism. Consequently, in using lusitanization as a framework we erase distinctions between the spread of Catholicism (metaphysics) and (secular) political domination. The approach to lusitanization we adopt is therefore multidimensional insofar as it seeks to integrate religion, politics, economy, and culture into one. This means that lusitanization should be seen as a complex dispositif where different agents play entangled and dynamic political roles.

The idea of a miscegenated society emerged from interethnic relationships in Cape Verde, leading to 'cultural erasures and terror geographies in which slavery occurred' (Sarmento 2009: 526). In other words, miscegenation worked as a political idea that concealed historical power relations. Miscegenation was used by the Portuguese as a rationale for Portuguese colonialism. Portuguese colonizers were considered good Christians, able to live and mix amicably with Indigenous people (Freyre 1933). Such romanticized ideas of a friendly and miscegenated colonization were reinforced by the ideology of 'lusotropicalism' created by the Brazilian intellectual Gilberto Freyre in the 1930s to explain a formation of Brazilian identity that would have included the harmonious fusion of the Portuguese and Africans in the persona of the *mestizo*. Cape Verdeans, like Brazilians, built their national discourse by essentializing *mestizo* identity and thus whitening Blacks. The whitening of Blacks is part of the legacy of colonial linguistics. An idealization of miscegenation erased the use of violence in Cape

² More information can be found at http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=pomona_fac_pub

Verde and the asymmetrical, economic, and political differences which formed the basis of Portuguese colonization. Language mixtures were construed as reflecting and reinforcing miscegenation, evoking the idea of miscegenated languages or creolized languages.

However, the emergence of an interracial population in Cape Verde, similar to that in Brazil, was the product of a history of sexual violence. For example, colonial reports by adventurers and missionaries are littered with terms which describe the sexuality of Indigenous people, notably ‘incest, savage, corruption, inversion, cannibalism, polygamy, intoxication, luxury, buggery, nudity, bacchanalia and lust’ (Fernandes 2016: 239). Miscegenation was rejected by priests who, in the seventeenth century, requested that the Portuguese crown send Portuguese women to Cape Verde (Fernandes 2002). The ideology of miscegenation is based on the idea that Portuguese colonization did not produce segregated societies. For example, scholarship on Portuguese colonization is silent on the nature of racial differences between the Portuguese and other communities in Cape Verde, including those who were a product of miscegenation. The ideology underpinning miscegenation naturalized a social hierarchy in which local Blacks were at the bottom of the hierarchy and the Portuguese at the top, a hierarchy that was also reflected in a hierarchization of languages, with Indigenous languages at the bottom of the hierarchy and Portuguese at the top—interestingly, Portuguese was not described as an Indigenous language.

The relationship between Cape Verde and West Africa, in particular Guinea Bissau and Angola, dates back to the slave trade. Slavery was a defining feature of Portuguese politics as well as of lusitanization in Cape Verde, since ‘Portugal was the first European nation to initiate slavery in Africa, and was the last to abolish it’ (Lobban 1995: 25). The politics of slavery in Cape Verde played an important role in the colonial classification system. As a feudal economic system, slavery had three foundations: plantations, trade relations, and domestic work. Slaves were classified into three categories by the Portuguese: (i) African-born (*escravos novos*), (ii) Cape-Verdean-born (*escravos naturais*), and (iii) baptized or ‘civilized’ (*escravos de confissão* or *ladinos*;) (Lobban 1995).

Bonds between Cape Verde and Brazil were based mainly on the slave trade. After 1750 Marquis de Pombal established political rule in Brazil, based on the ideals of the Enlightenment that dominated Europe during the eighteenth century. Enlightenment philosophy and science were used to justify enslavement, both politically and economically. The Marquis de Pombal’s colonial policy became official in 1755 through a law (*Diretório dos Índios*) that defined Portuguese as the

official language of Brazil and formalized the slave trade from Cape Coast (Ghana) to northern Brazil through the creation of the *Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão* (General Company of Grão Pará and Maranhão).

In the nineteenth century, following the Berlin Conference (1884–5), Portugal embarked on an intense occupation of African territories, following the international principle of *utis possidetis* that stipulates the right of possession to those who occupy the territory. Among African territories, Cape Verde played a strategic geopolitical role in Portuguese domination. The process of occupation of African territories by the Portuguese was reinforced by the creation of schools and administrative structures, in Cape Verde and also elsewhere.

Western literacy practices were introduced in 1842 with the introduction of printed materials, printing presses, and secondary schools. There is a strong relation between the colonial enterprise and the introduction of literacy in the colonies. Literacy was used ideologically as a strategy to spread and consolidate colonization. The educational apparatus in Cape Verde contributed to the creation of a Creole elite. In this colonial context, education helped to reinforce the social and racial hierarchies which in turn reinforced a linguistic hierarchy as well. The educated were largely but not exclusively white. Education was about the construction of a whitening cultural process, through which educated *mestizos* and Black people could come to be considered white (Fernandes 2002). Priests were replaced by teachers, particularly after the split between the Church and politics in Portugal's domination of Cape Verde that developed after 1910 with the emergence of the Portuguese Republic and the laicization of political power.

In 1933, Portugal passed the *Colonial Act*, which imposed upon the African population a series of principles that formally and legally created a basis of racial differentiation between Portuguese and African Indigenous people. Proficiency in Portuguese was used as a key principle for the legitimization of racial difference. The Colonial Act included the *Estatuto do Indigenato* ('The Native Statute') which stipulated a strong relation between being Indigenous and Black, and not speaking, reading, or writing Portuguese, as the following:

Article 1 Indigenes are all individuals of Black race, or its descendants, who are not covered by the provisions of Article 2 of this document and who do not jointly meet the following conditions: a) speak, read and write the Portuguese language; b) have assets that provide enough subsistence or have any profession, art or craft that provides the income needed to support themselves... c) have good behavior and do not practise the common customs of their race; d) have completed military duty according to the laws on recruitment.

(*The Native Statute* 1929: 60, our translation)³

³ Artigo 1º são considerados indígenas todos os indivíduos de raça negra, ou dela descendentes, que não estejam abrangidos pelo disposto no Artigo 2º deste Diploma e não satisfaçam conjuntamente

In Cape Verde there was an intermediate category between the Portuguese and the Indigenous population. This additional category, referred to as a Creole, created a tripartite division in Cape Verde, a division that was reinforced by lusitanization and the use of Portuguese as a first language by the Portuguese colonialists.

The intermediate status occupied by the Creole elite of Cape Verde positioned them as an assimilated people. They were intellectuals, who in 1936 created the journal *Claridade* ('Clarity'), whose aim was to define the cultural and linguistic values of the Cape Verdean identity as different from the African identity. The Cape Verdean *mestizos* were compared to Europeans and not to Africans, suggesting that Cape Verde would be part of Europe rather than of Africa. The colonial and negative meaning of *mestizo* as a mixed identity was replaced by the idea of the harmonization of races (Fernandes 2002). Literature was thus used by the *mestizo* elite in Cape Verde as an instrument of political resistance against colonization and in defence of Creole as a symbol of national identity. Between 1930 and 1940, the journal *Claridade* articulated resistance against colonialism in defence of a Cape Verdean identity. Within colonial history, creolization was thus used as a marker of national identity, as well as being a symbol of resistance (Corrado 2008). Lusitanization was turned inside out when Portuguese was used as an instrument of resistance by the elite, even though it was also used by the Portuguese as part of their colonial enterprise. The emergence of a Creole language will be discussed in the next section.

As with other African elites, the Cape Verdean intellectual elite played a major and controversial role in shaping the nature of Cape Verdean identity in the twentieth century and the legacy of the engagement of African elite is still felt today in the sociolinguistic analysis of Cape Verde. This ranged from the affirmation of Africanness to an emphasis on miscegenation/creolization (*mestiçagem*; Dos Anjos 2000). While the political affirmation of an African identity would point towards the recognition of ethnic pluralism as constitutive of the nation-state, the defense of *mestiçagem* was used to support a fusion of diverse ethnic identities into a single one, the Cape Verdean. At the bottom of Cape Verde's colonial pyramid were the *badius* (the term *badiu* comes from the Portuguese word *vadio*, which means 'lazy'), African and freed people who contributed to the development of African cultural and linguistic practices, such as music and religion. Paradoxically, the *badius* became a nationalistic Africanist symbol in the independence struggle with Portugal, representing themes of music, musical instruments, and dances, such as *batuku*, *funana*, *coladeira*, *morna*, and *tabanca*. Some dance styles were declared part of Cape

às seguintes condições: a) Falar, ler e escrever a língua portuguesa; b) Possuir bens de que se mantenham ou exercer profissão, arte ou ofício de que auferam o rendimento necessário para o sustento próprio . . . c) Ter bom comportamento e não praticar os usos e costumes do comum da sua raça; d) Haver cumprido os dever militares que, nos termos das leis sobre o recrutamento, lhes tenha cabido (*Estatuto do Indigenato* 1929: 60).

Verde's intangible heritage in 2013 by UNESCO, and were used in the independence struggle as symbols of resistance by local communities. The *badius* are an example of how power relations are constantly moving, dynamic, and multiple (Foucault 1980), and are a defining aspect of the concept of *dispositif*.

Their struggles for independence brought Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau closer, with the formation of a common political party that existed between 1963 and 1974: the PAIGC, *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* ('African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde'). The PAIGC's main leader, Amílcar Cabral, was Cape Verdean and also fought for Guinea's independence (Foy 1988; Lobban 1995). After independence, Cape Verde was ruled for ten years under a Marxist government. A historical connection existed between the independence movements against Portugal in Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, and São Tomé through the 1961 creation of the *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* ('Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies').

Cape Verde became independent in 1975 after a protracted struggle between the former Portuguese colonies and the violent Portuguese army during the Portuguese Colonial War. The dictatorial regime in Portugal, which had begun in 1926 under the rule of António Salazar, lasted until 1974, when several colonies became independent. Salazar created the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE) ('International Police in Defence of the State') with the intention of violently silencing opponents of his regime and members of resistance movements in the African struggles for independence, sending them to Tarrafel prison (known as the 'Camp of the Slow Death'), a concentration camp built in Cape Verde in 1936. Luandino Vieira, an Angolan writer and opponent of colonization, was imprisoned between 1964 and 1972 in Tarrafel, where (in 1965) he wrote the book *Luuanda*. This book, ironically, earned a Portuguese literary prize (Sarmiento 2009). The book mixes Portuguese and Kimbundo, currently the second most spoken national language in Angola, reflecting the power relations between Portuguese and Angolans in the day-to-day life of Luanda. The style adopted in the book illustrates the fact that resistance against Portugal in Cape Verde did not necessarily mean objection to the Portuguese language, in a process of 'nativization' of Portuguese.

Although Portuguese was declared the official language of Cape Verde in the Constitution of 1980, Cape Verdean / Creole was promoted as an official language with the Constitution of 2010, alongside Portuguese. In 1998, the Creole orthographic system was created, based on the Latin alphabet, to promote writing practices in Creole. In terms of sociolinguistics, while Portuguese is used for administrative, religious, and educational purposes, Creole is used by most of the population, in some literary texts and in daily linguistic practices like songs, jokes, proverbs, informal talks, market language, private uses (family), and stories

(Carter and Aulette 2009). Like any other language, Cape Verdean Creole is also linguistically and socially stratified, meaning that several varieties are used in different regions and in different genres (such as the song style of *mornas* and *coladeiras*; Vilela 2005). In addition, the Cape Verdean mass media is influenced by Portuguese programmes and Brazilian soap operas, leading to the circulation of two varieties of Portuguese in Cape Verde. The meaning of Creole in Cape Verdeans' daily lives can be demonstrated by the following description by a Cape Verdean: 'Creole is the language that Cape Verdeans use to express what is coming from their soul' (Carla, as cited in Carter and Aulette 2009: 223). Creole is a strong symbol of the imaginary national identification of Cape Verdeans. Particularly in the diaspora, its use as a marker of identity is important, with approximately two thirds of the diaspora population living in the United States, Senegal, and Europe (Rego 2008). Language attitudes, however, cannot be considered uniform across the entire population, even though Cape Verdeans tend to share a broader feeling of community. The social meanings assigned to Cape Verdean Creole are in flux and, as with other languages, are still evolving, with some varieties being associated with the powerful and others with the less powerful.

4.3 Lusitanization and creolization as political frameworks

Lusitanization was a powerful ideological dispositif that characterized Portugal colonization and its relations with African, American, and Asian colonies. Such a dispositif gathered a complex arsenal of discourses, practices, and institutions that worked in favour of Portuguese colonization. Even though we focus on Portugal as the colonizer, we consider that the colonial enterprise was not vertical and top-down, but rather articulated a complex system of power relations, inventing and naturalizing hierarchical categories that reinforced new social and racial divisions. Lusitanization gathered several participants in complex and moving power relations, which means that the mutual relation between agent and structure should be understood in a broader perspective that considers the regimes of truth: "Truth" is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements' (Foucault 1980: 133). We argue that, in lusitanization, the Portuguese language was used to play a major role in the process of domination and control, helping to reinforce classificatory and racial categories, such as the idea of Creole languages that integrated lusitanization's regime of truth.

Linguistically, creolization typically meant a process of nativization of mainly European languages by producing a 'simpler' and less complex morphosyntactic structure than the original variety (Kouwenberg and Singler 2008). Definitions of creole languages have often emphasized notions of 'lack' and 'loss' of structural

categories, and this is politically and intellectually problematic. Consider the following discussion of typical features of creoles:

[T]he lack of inflectional morphology, the lack of derivational transparency, the lack of lexical tone, the presence of reduplicative structures, the presence of serial verb constructions. . . . Creole languages can thus be considered to be simpler than the so called orthodox languages because of the lack of transfer of paradigmatic complexity. (Parth and Veenstra 2013: 3–4)

European languages and their morphology were used as a framework of comparison and evaluation. European languages were used as norms against which creole languages were evaluated and were typically found wanting. For Creolistics, creoles involve ‘a disjunction between ancestral input language and the language acquired’ (Kegl 2008: 491); on a semantic level, Creoles were believed to be more transparent than other languages. In other words, ‘they display more one-to-one relation between meanings and forms’ (Leukfens 2013: 323). However, by emphasizing a direct meaning–form relation, one runs the risk of erasing colonial and silenced meanings by ‘constructing a sweet and amnesic present out of a painful past’ (Sarmiento 2009: 540). We argue that by reinforcing structural definitions of Creole, linguists avoid facing and problematizing the political nature of such definitions, as well as the social conditions that generated them.

The genealogy of Creoles connects them to Eurocentric scientific theories of evolution, reproducing racial binaries that might resonate with contemporary forms of social analysis (DeGraff 2003). Such a perspective assumes a structural interpretation of Creole that scientifically legitimizes it in relation to other languages, mainly Latin-derived ones, which means affirming that Creoles would be structurally and semantically simpler than the Romance languages that created them (Bakker et al. 2011). Creoles, like any other languages, we argue, should not be seen as isolated entities whose parts can be separated, described, and counted. Languages exist in relation to people’s linguistic and local social practices and what matters is what people actually do with language, particularly when colonial experiences and social meanings are deeply inscribed in the way languages are understood and politically manipulated.

The structural concepts of Creole languages should not be seen as ideologically dissociated from the epistemological and ontological nature of Christian discourses that maximize the racial connotation of inferiority or primitiveness in the concept of Creole. Both aspects, structural and religious, have strong ties with colonial enterprise and racial experience, as missionary practices helped to shape the discourses on languages and race in Africa (Makoni and Meinhof 2004; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Irvine 2008). Eurocentric and colonial practices produced discourses on the other by inventing identities and languages as a strategy of domination: ‘We Europeans are the only humans that, as historical

subjects and cultural actors, *have no identity* . . . The essence of Western culture is based on the will to give a name'⁴ (Lourenço 1991: 66–7). Naming languages was part of the colonial and missionary practices that integrated lusitanization (Makoni and Meinhof 2004).

In this chapter, we consider Cape Verde because of its political role as the centre of the Atlantic slave trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We see Cape Verde as working metaphorically as an *Árvore do Esquecimento* ('forgetting tree'): the *Baobá* around which Africans erase their past before being forcibly taken across the Atlantic (Saillant 2010). The process of forgetting was facilitated by religious conversion (baptism and change of name) as well as the imposition of Portuguese and its political ideology—as a consequence of the slave trade, forced miscegenation, and the imposition of European institutions (Mamdani 1996; Makoni and Meinhof 2004; Green 2009; Severo and Makoni 2014). All of these aspects constitute lusitanization: a complex semiotic and political dispositif that incorporated religion, slavery, language, education, and race.

We do not assume in this chapter the position of judges who aim to declare Portugal guilty. Rather, we see colonization as a perverse system that must continually be deconstructed, at all levels and domains, even though we run the risk of being trapped by the same categories we aim at problematizing. This is related to being able to narrate and legitimate other stories and histories that consider the perspective of the colonized. A dialectical perspective on colonization, taking into account the perspective of the colonized, is not a new perspective, however, and was articulated as early as 1838 by William Howitt in *Colonization and Christianity*:

We pride ourselves on our superior knowledge, our superior refinement, our higher virtues, our nobler character. We talk of the heathen, the savage, and the cruel, and the wily tribes, that fill the rest of the earth; but how is it that these tribes know us? Chiefly by the various features that we attribute exclusively to them. (Howitt 1838: 7)

From a critical viewpoint, we suggest that the decreolization of lusitanization creates opportunities to remember socially and politically violent acts, as opposed to erasure, which typically occurs in films, school materials, and other visual representations of colonialism (disseminated in Portugal during Salazar's dictatorship between 1933 and 1974), promoting the idea that the Portuguese had a natural inclination towards miscegenation that would make them more humane and less racist colonizers than, for example, Spanish or English colonizers

⁴ 'Nosotros, europeos, somos los únicos humanos que encuaneto sujetos históricos y actores culturales, *no tenemos identidad* . . . La esencia de la cultura occidental se cifra en la voluntad de darnos un nombre'.

(Almeida 2008; Pimenta, Sarmiento, and De Azevedo 2011). This idea of a more humane and cordial colonizer has to do with the ideology of lusotropicalism. This helped to justify Portuguese colonization politically as not racist or violent. However, the use of lusotropicalism by Salazar and Freyre to justify lusitanization was criticized by African writers like the Cape Verdean Baltasar Lopes (Medina 2000).

Camões, author of the national Portuguese epic *Lusiads* (1572), and Salazar, the Portuguese dictator, both created a narcissistic representation of a Portuguese empire. Rather than reinforcing chronological anachronism by invoking two different historical periods, we reflect on the colonial resonances of an imagined empire in contemporary facets of lusitanization. The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) was created in 1996 to link Portugal and its former colonies. CPLP erases previous histories and colonial relationships under the guise of a modern, economic, and political spread of language in former Portuguese colonies (Lourenço 1999). The CPLP aims at ‘spreading Portuguese cultural products around the world but never about the return journey, about the African and other cultural products in Portugal’ (Almeida 2008: 10).

The decreolization of lusitanization reveals its racial meanings that we are prone to erase from a structuralist perspective. The missionary invention of African languages for the purpose of Christianization is another consequence of lusitanization, since it ‘encouraged Africans to internalize European epistemology about themselves, creating a new view about their current affairs and superimposing new values on their past’ (Makoni 1998a: 243). Both the scientific invention of Creoles as simple or transparent languages, and the religious invention of languages as units to be labelled and described for the purpose of conversion, are examples of European and colonial inventions of the other. Lusitanization invented what we can call ‘Christian-lects’: languages and metalanguages that emerged as a product of encounters between Africa/Latin America and Christianity (Severo and Makoni 2015). Christian-lects encompass a large number of languages, including several African and Indigenous languages strongly influenced by Portuguese.

Christianity and Portuguese were used for both racial and economic reasons, since those who converted and spoke Portuguese were regarded as more important in the Atlantic slave trade located in the city of Santiago, Cape Verde:

Slaves from the African mainland were first sent to Santiago, where traders from the Spanish Indies came to buy . . . This practice kept the Spanish from trading directly with Africa, thereby undermining the lucrative Portuguese monopoly, but it also allowed the slaves to receive some instruction in the Portuguese language and in Christianity, which enhanced their value in the American markets. (Anon as cited in Newitt 2010: 152)

Christianity and lusitanization were strategies and rationales for the slave trade in Angola and Cape Verde. For example, only enslaved Africans who had become Christians could be sold, and only Christians could acquire them. Christianity, then, became a signal of the slave trade since it functioned as its prerequisite: ‘The Church in Angola derived much of its income by instructing and baptizing the enslaved, and the end of slave trade caused a financial crisis for the Luanda sea’ (Isichei 1995: 71).

In this chapter we construed lusitanization as a colonial dispositif composed of heterogeneous mix of elements, such as religion, race, slavery, and a complex system of hierarchies. In this dispositif, language plays a major role. The structural linguistic concept of (Cape Verdean) Creole helped to shape the image of structural mixture of languages as being harmonic and unproblematic, reinforcing an acritical sociolinguistic attitude of celebration of mixture and diversity (Makoni 2016). Such structural linguistic argument follows the political ideologies of miscegenation and lusotropicalism. We consider that such a concept of language contributed to overshadow the colonial and political trajectory that helped to legitimize hierarchies where Cape Verdean Creole emerged as a product of power relations. By decreolizing lusitanization we aim to epistemologically and politically question (i) the structural concept of Creole languages; (ii) the racial use of such a concept to differentiate and to create hierarchies between people; (iii) the connection between language and other colonial elements, such as race and religion; (iv) the unfortunate tendencies in some linguistic scholarship not to take into account the historical and political issues that underline the way language concepts were conceived in colonized contexts.

4.4 Final remarks

Portugal and Cape Verde were discursive products of lusitanization. The invention of Cape Verde through lusitanization and creolization implies the imposition of discourses and practices on identities and languages which is still relevant today. Lusitanization was spread through Christian practices of baptism and evangelization, the production of grammars and dictionaries, the slave trade, miscegenation, and modern institutions (such as schools). Lusitanization is a political sign that emerges from colonial encounters in particular contexts, and, as such, it can be deconstructed by considering communicative practices and social interactions as the locus where languages and other semiotic resources emerge. Contemporary scholars’ attempts to highlight hidden narratives of colonization from a critical viewpoint run the risk of creating new colonial relations based on the continuous production of discourses on the other from a Euro-American perspective: ‘Is there not an assumption on our part that our destiny is

that we should rule and lead the world, a role that we have assigned to ourselves as part of our errands into the wilderness?’ (Said 1989: 216)

In this chapter, we used lusitanization and creolization as frameworks for understanding the historical and social dynamics of language in a former Portuguese colony, Cape Verde. Even though lusitanization was a common framework for the analysis of language practices in former Portuguese colonies, the form lusitanization took depended on the complex relationship between the histories of the colonial agents who ultimately were the key actors in the spread of Portuguese. Lusitanization was a colonial *dispositif* constituted by former Portuguese colonies with historical similarities and differences. For example, in Brazil, lusotropicalism worked as an ideology; in Angola and East Timor, lusitanization was used as a military flag and as a symbol of national identity; in Mozambique, lusitanization co-occurred with Commonwealth and other local African identities. Portugal was also a product of lusitanization.

Lusitanization in Cape Verde was shaped by the role and history of slavery, and its plurilingualism was a product, in part, of the multiple ethnic and racial forces that dominated Cape Verde and were also extended by contemporary diasporic communities that retain links with Cape Verde in one form or another. Unfortunately, this study does not extensively use the perspectives of ‘local’ people to fully capture how they resisted and undermined lusitanization as a strategy of the powerful. Future studies should also explore the various ways in which organizations parallel to CPLP shape the nature of language practices for Portuguese. Creolization was used as a framework that helped us to problematize the way languages—Cape Verdean Creole in this instance—have been used as political signifiers, articulating racial and economic issues.