# Language Planning and Policy

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## *Ideologies, Ethnicities, and Semiotic Spaces of Power*

Edited by

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and Cristine G. Severo

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إهداء
إلى روح صديقنا وزميلنا
دكتور محمد بن رابح (رحمه الله)


In memory of our friend and colleague
*Dr. Mohamed Benrabah*

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

# CHAPTER THREE

# AMAZIGH LANGUAGE POLICY IN MOROCCO AND THE POWER OF CONTRADICTION[1]

## CHELSEA BENTON-MONAHAN AND CRISTINE G. SEVERO

*Ah, let me explain this word. We don't say Berber, we say Amazigh, because it has been a long time now that people have called us Berber, meaning they don't like them (us).*

Malika (interviewee for this research)

## 1. Introduction

Situated in the upper north-east corner of the African continent, Morocco has long stood as a crossroads between Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Countless people have crossed its borders and shores, and numerous empires have attempted to conquer its land. Within Morocco, language policy is a delicate matter that must be addressed for the betterment of the country, its people and its solidarity. Central to this issue is the Amazigh language, which has been battling for higher status and officiality against Arabic and French for almost seven decades now. Its speakers make up the so-called indigenous population of Morocco as well as its close neighbours of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Sahel, holding deep cultural ties to the land. Within the past two decades, the Amazigh community in Morocco has finally gained significant momentum in improving its status. One of the ways that this was achieved was by having its language officially taught in schools in 2003 and made into an official language, alongside Arabic, in 2011. However, this language policy has not played out in real life as it has on official paper, leaving its current status in a vague, unclear state. Many

are aware of the Amazigh language policy and the positive steps that the king has taken to support it, but very little can be found in regard to the policy after 2011, leaving one to wonder about its current state.

This chapter describes the Amazigh language policy based both on scholarly research and on a local individual's experience. It begins with a background of Moroccan history as it pertains to the Amazigh community and language. Then, it is explained how the Amazigh language gained recognition, first being taught in schools in 2003 and then being made into an official language in 2011, in contrast and comparison to the perspective of an Amazigh teacher in Morocco. An interview with an Amazigh teacher in Morocco called Malika was conducted in May 2017 by Chelsea Benton-Monahan in a city located in north-central Morocco. Malika knew the language and was of Amazigh origin. We aimed to examine the perspective of a local individual who had gone through the process of Amazigh's official recognition. We argue that the local teacher's personal experience with this language policy allows us to understand that the policy comes to light as a product of the tension between top-down and bottom-up forces. Even though it is not our purpose to generalise Malika's personal experience, we believe that by focusing on this individual narrative we may understand "the precise position they [the teachers] hold in society and reproducing at this scale the same sense of order and expectation we recognise as that of the society as a whole" (Miller 2009: 5).

The process to find a teacher that taught Amazigh was an arduous task that, when reviewed, showed a need to be included in the analysis of the interview, for it sheds light on the current political and social constructions that exist within Morocco. One example was the need for an official letter of approval which was written mainly in Modern Standard Arabic. On the top of this letter there was the royal crest of the monarchy, and to each side it stated the official name of the ministry: "Ministry of Education, Professional Training, Superior Teaching and Scientific Research." To the left it was written in Amazigh, and to the right it was written in Arabic. Since Amazigh is an official language, it is understandable why government documents now have Amazigh on them. If a simple letter used three languages to convey separate but necessary meanings, then it is not hard to imagine how the rest of society must use these languages interchangeably to effectively communicate. A second example is the interview, which took place in an administrative office within the school and lasted about 40 minutes. The interview was conducted in Moroccan Arabic, and afterwards we had to translate it into French, and then into English. In the interview, it took a great deal of energy for just three people in a room to understand one

another. Enlarge this to a national scale, and again, it is not hard to imagine the communicative difficulties that exist throughout the country.

This chapter is divided into three sections: first, we bring a general view of Morocco's culture, history and language policy; then, we focus on issues related to Amazigh in terms of language, ideology and power; and the third section is about the relationships between teacher education, literacy and standardisation of Amazigh. At the end of this chapter, it is concluded that in the case of the Amazigh language policy, the policy itself has been generated and maintained due to the interplay of these top-down and bottom-up forces. While this has unfortunately left it in an unclear, nebulous state, it has also allowed it to survive to this day.

## 2. Morocco: Culture, history and language policy

The official beginning of Morocco's history is contested among scholars, with many believing it began in the Arab-Islamic era during the 7th century. However, other scholars claim it dates back as far as the 3rd century during the period of Amazigh reign, when the majority of the population consisted of various ethnic groups that had settled in the area from different regions of the Eastern world, mainly being Amazigh with a few Jewish and Christian diasporas (Ennaji 2005). It wasn't until the Arab conquest in the 7th century that all this changed, for with this conquest came the religion of Islam and the language of Arabic. The majority of the population adopted this religion, and the association of Arabic with the Quran made it easy for the language to become the *lingua franca* of many communities. Amazigh ethnic groups, in the meantime, adopted the religion but dismissed the language. For this and other political or cultural reasons, they settled in the mountains and other desolate areas of the country, far away from the influence of the Arab culture. From this time forward, many Amazigh communities would continue to live in these remote areas and become marginalised from the larger society (Crawford 2002; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

In the Arab conquest, Arabic became the dominant language over Amazigh and a hybrid Arabic was born, which is distinctive to Moroccans and was used until recent times. The French Protectorate in Morocco lasted from 1912 to 1954. They developed French schools, used French as an official language for administrative processing and other governmental functions, established trade and businesses in French, and built new sections of cities that were designated only for the upper class (Ennaji 2005; Aitsiselmi and Marley 2008). With the Amazigh population, the French intentionally supported their culture and language in order to separate them

from the monarchy and the Moroccan majority, who were mainly of Arab origin. Actions such as these promulgated separations even further, creating even more animosity between those who considered themselves Amazigh and those who considered themselves Arab-Moroccan. This was a precursor to Amazigh national identity and rights, which would come later in the century (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, 2015; Wyrtzen 2011).

In response to years of French influence, an Arabisation movement began in Morocco to bring back Arab-Islamic identity, language and nationalism. Arabic became the official national language and Islam was declared the official religion of the state. Arabic was essentially given primary importance in all public matters as a means to establish and maintain this identity. However, the government allowed French to be taught in schools, and it continued to remain an integral part of society as well as a powerful symbol of prestige, education and wealth. Meanwhile, Amazigh retained little or no status at all and was seen only as a peasant language used for tradition and folklore (Ennaji 2005). This shows how languages can be taken as signals of dynamic and complex social, cultural and political struggles. With this history in mind, we can better understand why and how Moroccans negotiate their identity through language.

It can be argued that language identity is also formulated through code-switching, in which interlocutors index certain language choices to reflect their stance or status. In other approaches, language is very closely correlated to ethnic identity, and therefore language choice is an attempt to negotiate proximity to an ethnicity. Others argue that language choice is contingent upon social, political or economic factors, which are continually changing, causing identity negotiation to become a fluid process. Lastly, some scholars believe that negotiation of identity through language choice is bound by power relations, with the standardised language holding most power due to its instillation by hegemonic institutions (Bucholtz and Hall 2004; Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004).

In terms of language policy, whereby top-down forces are driven by ideologies surrounding laws, politics or regulations, bottom-up forces are driven by the "people" as part of their language practices. In order to look at and analyse these bottom-up forces, Shohamy (2006, 2015) argues we must examine the variety of mechanisms that indirectly create a de facto language policy, both implicitly and explicitly. These mechanisms include rules and regulations; language education; language tests; language in public space; and ideology, myths, propaganda and coercion. In this specific case study of Amazigh, it is important to examine the myriad of top-down and bottom-up forces which form the Amazigh language policy.

In certain contexts, language policies are explicitly stated from the top in order to make transparent a specific change, ideology or statute (Edwards 2013). This can be done through specific doctrines, curriculum, texts, etc., and sends an explicit message in regard to the language and its implementation within the nation state. In other cases, a policy is implicitly enacted through de facto practices, which are generated from the bottom-up and often reflect the culture within which the policy is being enacted (Shohamy 2006; Spolsky 2012). It is only through covert policy actions that the policy is maintained, but these remain unseen by the majority of the population.

Morocco is considered a multilingual state: Moroccan Arabic is the main dialect but it is not written, and therefore Modern Standard Arabic must be used for all literature, forms, etc. French is not an official language but many find it valuable for educational and economic reasons, and therefore they still learn and use it. Amazigh is an official language of the state and must be used for governmental purposes. The intricacies that lie within the day-to-day functionality of a multilingual state come to the fore in this process, and we can see why the Amazigh community may struggle for their language to be recognised.

Language policy in Morocco is complex. In the location where the research for this study was conducted, Moroccan Arabic was the main language of communication between Moroccans, demonstrating that we were in an area where the majority were of Arab descent, which is the majority population of Morocco who thereby holds the most power. Modern Standard Arabic was used on all of the signs in the administrative buildings – no French nor Amazigh could be seen. This reflects the government's ideology that Arabic is the official and most powerful language of the nation state. By utilising only Arabic on their signs, it was sending a strong message that one needed to know Arabic to be there.

As an example, Modern Standard Arabic was also used on the approval letter we mentioned above, where religious phrases were written on behalf of the monarchy. This is reflective of the religious identity of the state, for as an Islamic country, Arabic is used to represent their affiliation and devotion to the religion. French – representative of the West, modernisation, science and economics – was used on my [Chelsea Benton-Monahan] behalf as the Westerner and was not difficult for most of the Moroccans to utilise. One who knows French is often considered "educated," and therefore those within this specific office had taken the time to learn this language and reflect that identity. Amazigh was on the approval letter next to the seal of the monarchy, for the letter was an official document, but other than the letter and the Amazigh written on the school signs, it could not be seen nor heard.

# 3. Amazigh: Language, ideology and power relations

 "Amazigh" refers to the group of so-called indigenous people that inhabit parts of Morocco, Algeria and adjoining parts of the Sahel. In Morocco, estimates vary but many figures show that the Amazigh make up approximately 30-40% of the population (around 15 million), which is the largest percentage of any country in North Africa (Ennaji 2005; Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe 2011; Zouhir 2014; El Aissati, Karsmakers and Kurvers 2011). Within Morocco there exist three predominant groups of Amazigh: Tashelhit in the southern desert regions; Tamazight in the central plains; and Tarifit in the northern Rif mountains (see Figure 3.1). All three speak different varieties of the Amazigh language, which are often unintelligible to one another (Sadiqi 2011). Based on personal observation within the country, many other groups exist from region to region, and even village to village. They wear different clothing, perform different rituals, live off the land differently and have their own traditions. This shows how languages do not exist prior to an individual's shared life and mode of living; rather, languages are a product of social and historical practices.



Figure 3.1: Amazigh dialects in Morocco (Map of Berber and Arab Morocco, 2009–2015; source: http://www.mappi.net/morocco.php)

Many Amazigh communities live in remote rural[2] areas as a result of fleeing the Arab conquest. This has resulted in their marginalisation throughout the centuries, leaving them underprivileged and economically disadvantaged (Crawford 2002). Such precarious economic conditions helped to reinforce ideological perspectives that articulated poverty, lack of education, illiteracy, simplicity, oral tradition and rurality (Makoni and Meinhof 2004; Severo and Makoni 2015). The World Bank currently reports that Moroccans living in rural areas represent 46% of the population, but 66% of the poor live in rural areas (Morocco: Poverty Update 2015).

Many Amazigh are monolingual; sometimes Moroccan Arabic becomes their second language if they are exposed to the larger society, which often happens to men if they leave their village and move to a city in search of work. As a result, rural Amazigh women are often not exposed to other languages. They tend to stay at home and raise their families, which inevitably allows them to pass the language on to younger generations. Amazigh were traditionally only ever considered to be literate if they could read or write Arabic or French, which of course was contingent upon their exposure to education. Since the Amazigh had no writing system for such a long period of time and education has always been scarce in the countryside, Amazigh speakers have often been considered illiterate and uneducated (Ennaji 2005). We see that gender and linguistic differentiation are reinforced by the economic role played by individuals as well as by their concept of family, childcare and education.

By this general report we may identify how languages index social and political meanings (Irvine and Gal 2000). Scholarly research in the field of language ideology is varied and a unified definition has yet to be established, for the literature is diverse and there are a host of definitions surrounding the term (Anchimbe 2007; Kroskrity 2004; Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity 1998). Despite this variety, a basic description in the book *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory* by Schieffelin et al. (1998: 20) encompasses its meaning:

> … ideologies of language are not about language alone. Rather, they
> envision and enact ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and
> to epistemology. Through such linkages, they underpin not only linguistic

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[2] The definitions of "rural" and "urban" in Morocco may differ, but in this context rural areas include farmland, mountain areas, the desert and any other natural land areas where there are not large numbers of inhabitants. Urban areas in Morocco are those which consist of enough occupants to create and populate a robust transportation system, suburbs, a city centre, government buildings, various restaurants, hotels, etc.

form and use but also the very notion of the person and the social group, as well as such fundamental social institutions as religious ritual, child socialization, gender relations, nation-state, schooling and the law.

In short, language ideologies are linked and influenced by a range of various social, economic and political factors. Kroskrity (2004) writes about this approach and the analysis of language and discourse as a political and economic resource utilised by speakers, ethnic groups and nation states. He provides five levels of organisation in regard to language ideologies, which help the reader understand how this field consists of a cluster of concepts with various dimensions. These levels are as follows:

1. Language ideologies represent the perception of language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group.
2. Language ideologies are profitably conceived as multiple due to the plurality of social divisions, meaning groups have the potential to produce divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group membership.
3. Members may display varying degrees of awareness of local language ideologies.
4. Members' language ideologies mediate between social structures and forms of talk.
5. Language ideologies are productively used in the creation and representation of various social and cultural identities.

Language ideologies in the complex situation we are analysing encompass an articulation of several categories, such as: (i) the relation between language and identity (Amazigh identity); (ii) the classification of Amazigh from a geographical perspective, which helps to differentiate sub-groups into this Amazigh identity as well as into Amazigh spoken language; (iii) the approximation of the ideas of oral tradition, childcare, being a mother and Amazigh language; (iv) the ruralisation of language by using it as an index of the ideological differentiation between urban and rural; (v) the relation between literacy and education; and (vi) the idea that what constitutes a language is an alphabet and a writing system. Also, during the analysis of the interview with Malika, we noticed that the influence of her parents' and grandparents' ideologies was reflected in her own personal experiences. Parents are undoubtedly affected by cultural, social and economic factors that influence their decisions to teach their children a specific language.

In terms of local protagonism, it is also necessary to understand the importance of the Amazigh movement, which consists of various but similar political/ethnocentral ideologies and actions (mainly protests) that have taken place in recent decades by those within the Amazigh community. When independence was gained, an Arabisation effort moved forward on behalf of the nation's nationalists, who called for a return to their Arab-Islamic roots, leaving both French and Amazigh behind. Amazigh was almost completely neglected, which contributed to the birth of the Amazigh Movement (Ennaji 2005; Collado 2013). This Movement has strived to improve their rights, promote their identity and raise their status within society through involvement within the country's political sphere, as well as challenging the ideological foundations of the country. This Movement not only exists in Morocco but also across North Africa, allowing it to be recognised at an international level (Maddy-Weitzman 2011). While most actions and protests by this Movement have been peaceful, it is important to note that some have not, such as the revolt in 1958–1959 by Amazigh tribes in the northern Rif region. Scholars attribute this Movement not only to the desire for more rights, but also to a national push towards democratisation in response to growing Islamic extremism; a new significance of diversity and pluralism that had gained momentum; and a new importance that was being given to minority, linguistic and human rights by international organisations (Errihani 2006; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

Ideologically, the Amazigh Movement consists of the following principles (Bouali 2012: 15), which helps us understand the efforts behind the Amazigh language policy:

1. Declare Amazigh as a national and official language in the Constitution.
2. Make Amazigh customs a source for national legislation.
3. Separation of religion from the state.
4. Grant certain Amazigh regions in Morocco self-rule.
5. Affirm the supremacy of international treaties over national law (which would allow Amazigh communities to defend themselves against the national government).

As can be seen, there are many other goals of the Movement besides elevating the status of the Amazigh language, turning language policy into a sociological and political field. In addition, it is imperative to understand the influence the Amazigh Movement played during the protests of the Arab Spring, which became known as the February 20th Movement. The

Amazigh Movement was one of the main driving forces behind these protests, which is what eventually pushed King Mohammed VI to make the language of Amazigh official in 2011. The king announced in a speech that along with other democratic processes, Amazigh would be instated in the Constitution as an official language alongside Arabic, pointing out the importance of Amazigh for Moroccan national identity. The constitutional Moroccan reform stated:

> Arabic remains the official language of the state, with the state laboring to protect it, develop it, and increase its usage. The Amazigh language is also considered as an official language of the state, since it represents a common credit for all Moroccans without exception. A law is to be formulated to determine the stages of the officiation of the Amazigh language and the manner of its inclusion in the field of education and the spheres of public life, so that the Amazigh language could, in the future, perform its task as an official language. (Bouali 2012: 32)

Once again, momentum for Amazigh language and culture began to increase even more, and its status was strengthened from a powerless folk language to a language of cultural identity.

## 4. Amazigh: Standardisation, literacy and teacher education

In 1999 King Mohammed VI began a series of reforms which included the 2000 Charter for Educational Reform, a new educational policy established to improve the state of education (Sadiqi 2011). Article 96 specifically called for the following (El Aissati et al. 2011: 213):

1. The reinforcement and improvement of Arabic teaching.
2. Diversification of languages for science and technology.
3. Openness to Tamazight.[3]
4. Increasing proficiency in foreign languages.

In Article 115 it then explicitly stated that local authorities were allowed to use Tamazight or "any local dialect" in order to facilitate the learning of the national language, which was Arabic at the time. The charter also allowed for Amazigh research and projects in universities, support for language teaching in Tamazight and the full implementation of Amazigh into every school curriculum by 2010 (Errihani 2006, 2008; Marley 2005).

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[3] Tamazight is the official term for the standard form of Berber language in Morocco.

At the same time, the king issued what is known as the "Berber Manifesto", a core text which described Amazigh national identity, laid out a historical narrative of Morocco in sharp contrast to the official national one, and depicted a clear program of remediation of their culture and status. Also, the Royal Decree of 2001 established the formation of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) (El Aissati et al. 2011; Maddy-Weitzman 2011; Sadiqi 2011). This organisation was established with the purpose of "preserving and promoting the Amazigh culture as well as reinforcing its status in national educational, socio-cultural and media context, and to give it a new impulse as a national heritage and a source of pride for all Moroccans" (El Aissati at al. 2011).

In terms of a standard language, there have been several variations of Tifinagh due to its interpretation by various scholars throughout the century, but not one variety alone could be considered the standard form. In addition, there were three different forms of Amazigh that had to be accounted for. As a result, the process of Amazigh standardisation developed an official script, which has become a contentious issue. In 2002 it was decided by the IRCAM in a vote that a standardised form of Amazigh was to be established for all forms of the language (El Aissati et al. 2011). Some believed that the Latin alphabet was best because it could be easily transcribed and used on computers. Others, such as Islamists, believed Amazigh was closer to Arabic since both languages belonged to the Chamito-semitic family. They also believed that since Amazigh were Muslim, it would give them more access to read and write Arabic, thereby improving their literacy and providing more access to the religion (Ennaji 2005). However, in the end, the council of IRCAM voted for Tifinagh as the standardised script (see Figure 3.2), under the pretence that this would strengthen Amazigh identity and consolidate language autonomy. Meanwhile, others disagreed and argued that it would hinder development since this was now a third script that Moroccans had to learn in addition to Arabic, French and English (Marley 2005).

Figure 3.2: Standard Tifinagh alphabet (with Arabic and Latin phonetic equivalents) (Kalserud 2017)

Such a process of Amazigh standardisation seeks for linguistic codification and uniformity by inscribing literacy in non-writing communities, which involves "a shift away from an indigenous world perspective towards a European-based one" (Makoni and Meinhof 2004: 89). Such a process aims at legitimating a language by inventing and adopting a non-local ideological framework of what counts as language. The standardisation ideology is strongly connected to the education system and helps to reinforce the idea that languages need to be systematised in order to be taught. Also, standardisation is connected to other ideologies and practices, such as the European idea of unification, nationalism and modernisation. We argue that in the ideological process of standardisation of African languages, such languages "were constituted as 'other' and the student as 'deficient', as someone who needs to learn and master the rules of their '(m)other tongue' by rote" (Deumert 2010: 249). Also, standardisation plays an important role in creating, inverting and reinforcing language ideologies. According to Malika, at the beginning of bringing Amazigh to her school, the parents' attitudes affected the children, but later this shifted and the children's attitudes originating in the educational context affected their parents, inscribing new meanings to what counts as Amazigh language.

Right after the language was made official, it was mandated that signs had to be written in Amazigh, despite the fact that many did not know how to read it. It can also be supported by the fact that these signs and official

letters in Amazigh were used in communities where the language was not spoken much, meaning they were not for functionality purposes but for representational purposes. The linguistic signage was perpetrated from the top-down to portray a specific ideology on behalf of the king, but from the bottom-up these signs were interpreted much differently.

For those who were illiterate in Amazigh, the expansion of signs in the language appeared to be a demonstration of the government's support towards it. For Malika, these signs were a reflection of the government's neglect towards the language policy, because during her interview she shared with us that many of these signs were incorrect. When she passed different signs, she couldn't help but notice that many had blatant errors. This frustrated her in two ways. First, it was another example of neglect on the side of the government. Second, it reflected people's lack of support for not only the language but also the policy, which was an initiative of the king. "They need to hire specialists in the language, not just anyone who thinks they know it", she stated. Therefore, from the bottom-up we have an interesting analysis of the signs based upon one's background. If one is illiterate in Amazigh, then this looks like a positive top-down action of support from the government. However, if one is literate in Amazigh, then this is a negative top-down action by the government. Therefore, all in all, the linguistic signage associated with this policy can be viewed in various different manners depending on one's own personal lived experience.

One example of how literacy helps to shape the concept of Amazigh language comes with its comparison to French and Arabic. For Malika, "They found it easy because the Amazigh language is written just how it is spoken, not like Arabic or French, where there are a lot of grammar rules." For her, this was a positive attribute that she utilised to gain support of its instruction. Yet this also backfired in a way, because she said many did not view her and other Amazigh teachers as "specialists" but instead as non-advanced "elementary school" teachers. This attitude could have very well been because the language was "simple", a conception inherited from a framework of language based on written script. Either way, the attitude that the language was simple had an effect on Malika's instruction, the way others viewed it and her reputation as a teacher. This shows how language ideologies may operate in controversial ways depending on the context, agents and interests.

Educational language policies take on the top-down ideology of a policy and then disseminate that through the classroom. They are a critically important component to any language policy, serving as its "policy-makers" or main agent for policy implementation and success (Shohamy 2006). Research literature has examined educators and their roles as policy makers

due to their significant impact on policies (Aertselaer 2012; Davis 2014), which provides insight into a variety of cases where educators were interpreting, negotiating, resisting or restructuring language policies on the ground. Teaching Amazigh in the classroom was challenging not only because the educational system in Morocco already lacked infrastructure, but also because even native Amazigh speakers had to adapt to the new alphabet and develop methods of instruction for their classrooms. The majority of teachers only received two weeks of training before the policy's implementation in the autumn of 2003, and after that minimal training efforts were organised to assist teachers with the new scripts and language-teacher pedagogy (Errihani 2006).

Morocco isn't the only country where this minimal amount of training has been given to teachers; the same thing happened in Sudan when they shifted from teaching in Arabic to English (Abdelhay, B. Makoni and S. Makoni 2018). Based upon personal experience, if one goes to a rural Amazigh school in Morocco, one may likely find that the building is made of mud with little (if any) running water or electricity, which reinforces the ideological relation between poverty, rurality and illiteracy. There is often a single, shabby blackboard at the front and hard wooden chairs and desks for the students. Also, many people, including Amazighs themselves, do not believe that learning Amazigh will promote economic growth and stability for their children.

In 2003, when the policy was first implemented into schools, the momentum and support for it began to die out after a few years (Sadiqi 2011). In 2011, teacher training began to crumble and support for the maintenance of the policy began to subside after the very first year. As a result, the covert "inactions" of neglect by the government caused the general public to possess very little knowledge of what was ever happening in regard to the policy. In the case of Malika, once the government stopped its support, bottom-up (covert) forces then started arising to maintain the policy. Unfortunately, these were (and still are) unseen by the public eye.

In our individual's case study, Malika went through a teacher-training experience the first year the policy had been enacted and was then hired in an urban school. She was studying to become a biology teacher when she heard the government was recruiting students to become Amazigh teachers. As she described it, they seemed to simply show up and ask: "Who wants to teach Amazigh?" The government let teachers know that this was new and that there wasn't any methodology, but that they could "go ahead and try." Since Malika knew the language and was of Amazigh origin, she decided to sign up. The government then provided her with a full year of teacher training and language instruction in Amazigh, after which she was

placed in a larger city to teach non-native speakers of the language in order to create awareness of and support for the language and policy. After this, her official teaching experience could begin.

According to Malika, teacher training programs were shortened to three weeks and they started to try to recruit teachers who were already trained in the language; also, the Institute of Amazigh Culture never came to analyse the teachers' situations and the government did not make it mandatory to learn the language in junior or senior high school as it was supposed to do – just elementary school. Malika stated that the government stopped placing Amazigh teachers in the cities to create awareness of the language, but placed them in the countryside instead, where many already spoke the language. These examples of top-down actions by the government reflect their neglect of this policy over time.

In terms of agency and bottom-up politics, Malika gave many examples of the actions that she and others took on their own to maintain this policy despite the lack of government support. One of the first and most vivid examples is her stamina in teaching the language despite the pushback from parents, since they were not happy at the beginning that their children were learning Amazigh. Malika also made her own classroom materials. She and other teachers only had one version of a textbook to work from and therefore when she needed photos or additional reading materials, she made them on her own. Malika also shared information about the Amazigh culture and way of life, including poems, songs and folklore stories of the oral tradition. Amazigh has traditionally been an oral language passed down from generation to generation through family members. Along with this practice came a strong oral tradition of poetry, songs and folklore (Hoffman 2008).

## 5. Conclusion

As a result of the historical background, literature review and analysis provided in this chapter, we can see the current status of this policy as it exists in its organic form: a policy both enacted and maintained from a complex interplay between the top-down forces which created it and the bottom-up forces which sustain it. From the beginning, the policy, first, had to be enacted and made official by the king of Morocco; without this, the Amazigh community would not have been able to gain nationwide support for this cause. It was then up to the government to move forward with teacher training and placement, classroom material production, changing signage throughout the country, and making sure that the infrastructure was in place for the language to be both used and taught. Yet after its induction, it was the actions of Malika and her fellow teachers that kept the policy alive

in local schools and communities. This supports the notions of many recent scholars in the field of language policy who have argued that we cannot simply examine the top-down actions that affect a policy, but we must also examine the coexistent bottom-up actions.

We also believe that local people's opinion should be taken seriously, as it was during our experience with Malika. From her perspective, the language policy was enacted just to calm the Amazigh Movement protestors during the Arab Spring in 2011, because after all it was this Movement that had spurred many of the protests and unrest throughout the country during this time. Therefore, many have argued that the king made Amazigh an official language simply to appease the Amazigh population and thereby keep the country safe from a revolution. Malika too had begun to believe this was the case after four years of teaching Amazigh. As a result of her experience and the neglect she felt, she believed it was quite obvious that Amazigh was made an official language to simply "calm them".

Finally, with this specific study, it seems safe to go one step further and say that both top-down and bottom-up actions must be examined together, for it is only then that we can get a true picture of a policy as a whole – not just what it is from the top or the bottom, which is merely from one angle, but what it is as a complete entity once the various forces surrounding it come into play.

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